INTRODUCTION Do for-profit corporations have a right to religious liberty?
That is, may a business that sells craft materials or manufactures wood cabinets be excused from obeying a law because it imposes a substantial burden on its religious conscience? This question was front and center in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 1 According to the Supreme Court, the answer is yes: Corporations are "persons" entitled to religious exemptions under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
The Hobby Lobby case was one among dozens challenging the Obama administration's "contraception mandate." The Affordable Care Act requires large employers to provide health care insurance that offers basic preventive care at no extra cost to employees. 2 For women, basic preventive care includes FDAapproved contraception.' This contraception requirement triggered intense religious opposition. For example, Catholic doctrine condemns artificial birth control, and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) complained that the mandate represents "an unprecedented . . . violation of religious liberty." 4 The President of USCCB went so far as to decry the mandate as "simply un-American." 5 Not all employers, however, were affected by the contraception mandate in the same way. Religious employers such as churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and their auxiliaries have always been completely exempt. 6 Religiously affiliated non-profit employers such as Catholic Charities are essentially exempt, 7 and were for a long time protected by a safe harbor while the administration finalized its compromise plan. 8 Consequently, challenges brought by for-profit corporations were the first to reach the Supreme Court. 9 Corporate plaintiffs asserted that forcing them to provide contraception violated their right to religious liberty guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause'" and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act." Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national chain of arts and crafts stores, sought an exemption from the contraception mandate on the ground that requiring it to offer employees certain types of birth control violates its religious conscience." The plaintiff in a companion case, Conestoga Wood Specialties 7. Religiously affiliated non-profit employers do not have to include contraception in their health insurance plans or "contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraception coverage." Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,874 (June 28, 2013). Instead, their employees would receive a separate contraception policy paid for by a third-party insurer. Id.
8. During the safe harbor time period, lawsuits brought by non-profit plaintiffs were generally held in abeyance or dismissed as unripe. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding case in abeyance).
9. Plaintiffs actually include corporations and their owners. This Article focuses on the novel question of whether corporations qua corporations are ever entitled to religious exemptions. For the owners, the question is not whether they can bring free exercise claims-as natural people, they can-but whether the claim has any merit. That question is beyond the scope of this Article. Corporation, a manufacturer of wood cabinets, advanced similar claims,' 3 as have businesses that sell outdoor power equipment, 4 recycle scrap metal," and manufacture vehicle safety systems1 6 and HVAC equipment."
Whether the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protect corporate "people" in the same way they protect natural people was a question of first impression. For-profit corporations had never before sought conscientious objector status and the Supreme Court had never before evaluated corporate religious liberty. s While the Supreme Court did not reach the Free Exercise Clause question, it did rule that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) covers closelyheld 9 for-profit corporations." It also concluded that the objecting businesses should be exempt from the contraception mandate. 2 From start to finish, much of the Court's reasoning is questionable. Rather than focus on the Court's missteps when applying RFRA's substantial burden and strict scrutiny tests, 22 13. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep Cir.) (writing that the Supreme Court "has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims brought by... for-profit corporations").
19. Although there is no single definition of "closely-held corporation," there is consensus that a closely-held corporation is characterized by a small number of stockholders. The IRS, for example, defines a closely-held corporation as one where more than 50% of the stock is owned by five or fewer individuals. 21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 ("The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA.").
22. Among other things, the Court erred in its willingness to find that facilitation of other people's sins via employee health insurance was a substantial religious burden; its reluctance to recognize that making contraception available to working women was a compelling state interest; and its conclusion that the contraception mandate failed strict scrutiny because third parties (the insurers or government) could provide the health care instead. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775-85. this Article criticizes the necessary predicate:" the idea that forprofit corporations possess religious rights and qualify for religious exemptions. 4 There is no principled basis for corporate religious liberty.' 5 For-profit corporations lack the inherently human characteristics that justify religious exemptions for individuals. They cannot, for example, be said to possess either a relationship with God or inherent dignity. Nor do they possess the unique qualities that arguably justify exemptions for churches. Unlike churches, forprofit corporations are not sacred, primarily religious, or the source of theological truth. They are not even voluntary associations -employees at for-profit corporations simply cannot be equated to the voluntary members of a church. Furthermore, the deleterious consequences of corporate religious liberty, magnified by corporations' extensive power, argue against its recognition. Part I addresses the theoretical question and Part II discusses the harmful results of corporate religious liberty. 25. "Corporate religious liberty" is shorthand for the religious liberty of secular forprofit corporations. While non-profit groups may also incorporate, I will generally refer to non-profit corporations as non-profit organizations for the sake of simplicity. individuals and churches. At the core of religious liberty is respect for the religious conscience of natural people. This is a uniquely human characteristic that corporations do not possess. Furthermore, attempts to equate for-profit corporations to churches and other voluntary religious associations are bound to fail. Thus, the reasons to protect people and churches do not apply to for-profit corporations.
While Hobby Lobby relied on RFRA rather than the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA is inextricably connected to the Free Exercise Clause. Congress passed RFRA in response to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 6 a Supreme Court decision that weakened Free Exercise Clause protection. As the "Restoration" in its name indicates, RFRA was intended to restore as a matter of statutory law the pre-Smith constitutional test. RFRA's language also demonstrates that it meant to track the Free Exercise Clause. For example, RFRA's statement of purpose discusses religious liberty in terms of the Free Exercise Clause, noting that "the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution." 7 The original statute also defined "exercise of religion" as "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution."" Thus, RFRA's text explicitly connected the scope of its protection to the protection offered under the Free Exercise Clause. 9 Because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is informed by free exercise jurisprudence, the analysis focuses on religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause. 6-7 (1993) . ("It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened ... ").
A. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS
30. Because these categories are not mutually exclusive, religious liberty can be viewed as advancing both. protect uniquely human attributes: a person's relationship with God, 31 or a person's conscience, dignity, and autonomy. Consequently, religious liberty is uniquely human, and it makes no sense to extend it to for-profit corporations. Indeed, although the Supreme Court dismissed any difference between a profitseeking person and a profit-seeking corporate person, 32 the distinction is obvious: only one involves an actual human being.
Whether a particular constitutional clause reaches for-profit corporations depends not on the personhood of the corporation but on the scope of the clause. In deciding whether corporations are "persons" protected by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has sometimes answered "yes, 33 and sometimes answered "no.,
It has never announced an overarching framework for analyzing corporate rights. 3 " The closest the Court came to doing so was in 31 . Although most religious people in the United States belong to a faith that centers around a God, not all of them do. Some religious people have different names or conceptions of their Supreme Being, while other believers have no gods/goddesses at all. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will refer to the spiritual dimension as an individual's relationship with her "God" or "Creator," aware that it does not quite capture all spiritualties.
32. 36 where it wrote that certain "purely personal" guarantees do not extend to corporations 37 and that "[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision."" In other words, whether a constitutional provision should apply to a corporation depends on what exactly it is meant to protect. If the Free Exercise Clause protects something that is unique to natural people, then its protection should be limited to natural people.
Despite scholarly disagreement about its perimeters, there is near universal agreement that at its core the Free Exercise Clause protects individual religious conscience.' In Wallace v. Jaffree, for example, the Supreme Court wrote: "As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience." 41 Nor was this the only time the Supreme Court made this point. 42 that corporations are persons under the Constitution. Thus, there is no coherent, consistent way of defining corporate constitutional rights.").
36. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 37. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 ("Certain 'purely personal' guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic function' of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.").
38. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14. 39. While the Supreme Court's decisions have been described as "ad hoc" and "inconsistent," Justice Rehnquist suggested that corporations should be granted constitutional rights if and only if those rights facilitate their economic activity. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitutional rights of corporations should be limited to those "necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes" personal autonomy-that is, individual self-determination"-is a touchstone of constitutional rights." "Certain 'zones of conscience' are entitled to legal protection .... [to] protect the right of individuals to define and govern their own existence." 51 In particular, religious conscience is protected in order to safeguard "the right of an individual to make choices about his or her spiritual life.
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Under this view, compelling people to act contrary to their conscience may cause dignitary harm. " [T] he free exercise of religion is essentially a dignitary right. It is part of that basic autonomy of identity and self-creation which we preserve from state manipulation ... because of its importance to the human condition." 53 The underlying assumption is that all human beings possess inherent dignity.' "This dignity gives man an intrinsic worth, a value sui generis that is 'above all price and admits of no equivalent."' 55 The explanations for why vary, 56 and the relationship among conscience, autonomy, and dignity is not straightforward, but the three are inextricably linked, and the bottom line is that respecting religious autonomy/conscience is 56. "Multiple religious and philosophical theories and conceptions seek to justify this metaphysical view." Barroso, supra note 49, at 335-37 (describing religious, philosophical, and historical sources for the concept of inherent worth).
very much about respecting the inviolable dignity of the human person."
Neither Justification Applies to For-Profit Corporations
As should be apparent from this brief examination of the core goals of the Free Exercise Clause, this constitutional right only makes sense when applied to actual people. Whether the religious-or autonomy-based justification ultimately carries the day is irrelevant for purposes of determining corporate rights because both justifications are intimately tied to respecting human rights. 5 "
The religious justification, which centers on obligations to the divine, is about the relationship between "man and his Creator." While people may fear and/or love God, and people may suffer sorrow, pain, shame, or guilt for acting contrary to conscience, forprofit corporations cannot. 5 9 As should be self-evident, corporations are not sentient and cannot feel anything." They have no sacred relationships, 6 " and they certainly do not have a The secular justification equally depends on uniquely human qualities. Respect for religious conscience ultimately traces back to ensuring respect for people's dignity and autonomous decisionmaking. The dignity at issue is human dignity, based upon the idea that humans are ends in themselves, not means to an end. "[Hiuman beings have no price and cannot be replaced because they are endowed with an absolute inner worth called dignity." ' 63 While humans are inherently worthy, for-profit corporations, of course, are not. They are by definition instrumental entitieslegal fictions created to facilitate economic growth. 6 "Their merely instrumental rationale leaves them with a morally different status than living flesh and blood people-the people Kant argues must be valued as ends.... " 65 Dissolving or selling a corporation does not raise the same moral qualms as killing or selling a human being. 6 In short, insofar as religion is concerned, corporations are not people, and they are not like people. 6 7 They lack the fundamentally human attributes-whether it be a relationship with the divine or inviolable dignity-that justify religious liberty rights.
In sum, the reasons why we protect the religious liberty of individual persons do not apply to corporate persons. Corporations do not have relationships with God. Corporations do not possess an inviolable dignity. To extend religious liberty exemptions to them distorts the constitutional order by providing accommodations to entities that neither need nor deserve them.
B. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Free Exercise Clause protection also extends to churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and other houses of worship ("churches" for short). 8 Protecting churches facilitates individual 63. Barroso, supra note 49, at 360 (describing Kant's view of human dignity). 64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Breyer, J. dissenting) ("Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their 'personhood' often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of 'We the People' by whom and for whom our Constitution was established."). 66. Baker, supra note 65, at 988 (noting that killing a corporation elicits none of the "moral qualms that the death penalty famously raises for flesh-and-blood people.").
67. Cf Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office.").
68. The Hobby Lobby Court seemed to assume without discussion that all nonprofits (or perhaps all religious non-profits) were fully protected by the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, while free exercise protection for churches is well-established, free exercise religious practice. After all, while religious practice may be a solitary endeavor for some, for others it is a group activity. 6 9 As the Supreme Court has noted, "For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community."" To fully protect these religious individuals, it is necessary to protect their religious associations.
Just as the Supreme Court saw no meaningful distinction between profit-seeking human people and profit-seeking corporate people, it saw no meaningful distinction between nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations. According to the Supreme Court, since non-profit religious corporations like churches merit coverage, so should for-profit religious corporations as they are the same in all important respects. They both take the corporate form, and they both are institutions through which people exercise their religion. In fact, however, the reasons we protect churches do not ultimately apply to forprofit corporations.
Actually, the justifications and appropriate scope of free exercise protection for churches is hotly contested. This protection for other religious non-profit corporations is not. challenged regulation required its members to act contrary to their religious beliefs." Yet, according to the Court, because conscience claims protect individual conscience, they must be brought by an individual. 80 The proxy approach offers little support to for-profit corporate religious liberty claims, which, by definition, focus on corporate "conscience" rather than individual conscience. 8 ' In any event, it assumes that the church is a voluntary association and, as discussed below, for-profit corporations do not fit that bill.
Church as Church
Another approach argues that churches are entitled to free exercise protection separate and apart from their members. 82 Under this approach, churches qua churches are religiously significant. It is hard to deny churches' distinct place in religion clause jurisprudence. For example, the Tax Code contains a ''parsonage exemption" that provides tax benefits to ministers of churches-a tax break available to no one else. 83 Of all private non-profit organizations entitled to tax exempt status, only churches are not required to prove their exempt status, 8 4 only churches are not required to file an annual tax return, 85 and only churches are exempt from employment taxes. 6 Along these lines, church property disputes are resolved differently than other property disputes.
79.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 321. 80. Id. (holding that since "it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion, the claim asserted here is one that ordinarily requires individual participation").
81. In addition, if groups are merely a means to the end of enhancing individual liberty, then they are presumptively entitled to constitutional protection only to the extent that they do, in fact, enhance individual liberty of the group's members. itself." 9 Indeed, for some Catholic theologians, "[C]hrist's identification with the Church is so complete that the Church must be seen as his earthly body, a sacred subject, the bride of Christ 'without spot or wrinkle."' 9' In short, the argument is that churches deserve special treatment because of their link to the divine. 9 In addition, it has been argued that churches as independent institutions are pivotal in advancing free exercise. That is, institution against an individual member and held that the religion clauses required a "ministerial exception" 96 exempting churches from discrimination suits by their ministers.' The rationale behind Hosanna-Tabor is that the government should not interfere with churches' internal governance, especially their choice of ministers. The ministerial exemption is necessary not only because ministers embody the church's beliefs," but also because they are instrumental in helping to shape them.'" The bar against "imposing an unwanted minister ... protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.' ' 1 Since the choice of minister potentially "affects the faith and mission of the church itself,"'" the state should play no part in that decision. 3 The logic of the church-qua-church approach falters when applied to for-profit corporations. There are several significant differences between non-profit churches and for-profit corporations. Moreover, to argue that the two are indistinguishable tends to negate the reasons to treat churches as entitled to special autonomy in the first place."
First and most obviously, the practice and promulgation of religion is the overriding purpose of a church. Even assuming that an arts and crafts chain store or wood cabinet manufacturer is 96. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 ("We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.").
97. Although there was evidence suggesting Hosanna-Tabor fired a "minister" in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the ministerial exception precluded an ADA lawsuit. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704.
98. Douglas Laycock describes church autonomy as "the right of churches to conduct [religious] activities autonomously: to select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions." Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1389.
99. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (explaining that government may not "depriv[e] the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs").
100. See, e.g., Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1391 ("When the state interferes with the autonomy of a church, and particularly when it interferes with the allocation of authority and influence within a church, it interferes with the very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the future.").
101. capable of exercising religion-itself a debatable proposition"' -it is unlikely to be its principal goal. By definition, for-profit corporations exist to make money; otherwise they would be nonprofit. Thus, the Supreme Court misses the mark when it argues that for-profit corporations are just like religious non-profit corporations except that they also make money. The difference is not that for-profit corporations have monetary goals; the difference is that for-profit corporations do not have predominantly religious goals.
Second, for-profit corporations do not share the unique qualities that have been cited to justify churches' preferential treatment. In the eyes of their followers, churches are sacred entities established by God. For-profit corporations are not. Churches are the source of theological truth. For-profit corporations are not. The ministerial exception recognized in Hosanna-Tabor is confined to the church's relationship with its minister, because ministers are essential to the creation, embodiment, and dissemination of the faith."° There is no logical counterpart to the minister in corporations because corporations simply do not play the same role as churches. While some might try to stretch the definition of a church (and minister) to include non-profit religious corporations," the term would become meaningless if expanded to include for-profit corporations.
For-Profit Corporations Are Not Voluntary Associations
A third major difference between non-profit churches and for-profit corporations is that both approaches, the church-asproxy and the church-qua-church, assume churches are voluntary 105. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) ("General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiouslymotivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.").
106. The idea that church autonomy ultimately protects the development of beliefs rather than religious practice finds some support in the Court's attempt to distinguish Employment Division v. Smith by claiming that Smith was about "outward physical acts" while Hosanna-Tabor concerns "the faith and mission of the church itself." HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. As with many arguments in Hosanna-Tabor, whether it survives closer scrutiny is debatable. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 954-55 (2012). But it does illuminate the Court's conception of the free exercise protection extended.
107. Most obviously, Hosanna-Tabor's church autonomy roots limit it to churches, or at the very most, religious organizations (like seminaries and day schools) that play a pivotal role in the creation and dissemination of doctrine. religious associations." 8 For-profit corporations, however, are not.
Because any protection for a church depends on its members and must benefit its members under the church-as-proxy approach, it necessarily assumes that the church amounts to an aggregation of its individual members. The view of church and members as alter egos is shared by voluntary associations and underlies standing doctrine for voluntary associations: a voluntary association "is the appropriate party to assert [members'] rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical." ' 9 While the church may be more than the sum of its parts in the church-qua-church approach, those parts are still voluntary members of the church. The Hosanna-Tabor Court certainly assumed it was dealing with a voluntary religious association. ' The assumption is implicit in statements such as: "[T]he members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. 1 . Making this assumption more explicit, the concurrence observed that "[t]hroughout our Nation's history, religious bodies have been the preeminent example of private associations."" ' 2 It also referred to the rights of "voluntary religious associations"' ' 3 and the Court's freedom of expressive association jurisprudence" 4 when explaining why churches must have the power to remove unwanted ministers.
The voluntary nature of association is crucial to justifying church autonomy and ministers' concomitant loss of civil rights 111. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. The word "member" (as opposed to "employee") and "group" (as opposed to "corporation") are often used to describe those who voluntarily join an association.
112. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring (2000)).
under the ministerial exemption. " ' It is permissible to exclude ministers from anti-discrimination law's protection because they have consented to the church's rather than the state's adjudication of their employment claims. As the Supreme Court noted, "All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it."" 6 While this assumption may be contestable even in the case of ministers,"' it does explain the Court's willingness to grant a free exercise exemption. The association is exempt because all who are affected by the exemption-everyone who will be subject to the rules of the religious association rather than the rules of civil society-have consented to it. " 8 Thus even for churches, free exercise might protect church autonomy vis-A-vis its voluntary members, but not vis-A-vis those who have not voluntarily joined it. "An organization has no claim to autonomy when it deals with outsiders who have not agreed to be governed by its authority." 9 Consequently, to the extent that there is free exercise protection for churches, it is free exercise protection for voluntary religious associations. While it is true that individuals often exercise their rights through associations, for-profit corporations are not voluntary associations. First, the very things that define a modern corporation preclude viewing it as an association. Second, all those who are associated with the corporation cannot be described as voluntary members.
115. It is certainly presumed in the work of Douglas Laycock: "Voluntary affiliation with the group is the premise on which group autonomy depends." Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1405; see also Helfand, supra note 24, at 411 (" [T] he Court grounded the autonomy of religious institutions in the implied consent of their members.").
116. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring). 117. For example, it could be argued that civil rights cannot be waived in advance, which is the general law for employees. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (employees may not by contract prospectively waive their civil rights). Alternatively, perhaps any waiver of civil rights should require actual consent, not implied consent. Or, perhaps it can be argued that implied consent cannot exist without a right of exit, which is not realistically available to those committed to their religion. See infra note 150.
118. Brownstein, Heavenly and Earthly Spheres, supra note 53, at 100 (explaining that religious associations are "predicated on voluntary and consensual participation in a collective undertaking").
119. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1406.
a. For-profit corporations are not associations
Even if corporations are not like natural persons, perhaps they qualify as associations of natural persons and should be accorded free exercise protection not on their own behalf, but on behalf of their flesh and blood members. Hence the Court's insistence that protecting corporations is ultimately about protecting the people associated with them: "An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.'. 2 Although crucial to the Court's holding, its assumption that corporations like Hobby Lobby are essentially associations collapses under closer inspection. This is true whether a corporation is publicly traded or closely held, as were the family- 121. While the Hobby Lobby ruling was limited to the closely-held companies that had sued, it reasoning its not necessarily confined to closely held corporations. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court attempts to cabin its language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public or private."). to the Hobby Lobby Court. In fact, one of the early theories of the corporation conceived of it as an association of individuals."' The first cases extending personhood to corporations were based on an associational theory of corporations. Thus, when the Supreme Court first held that corporations were persons for equal protection purposes,"' it was with the understanding that the Court was protecting corporations in order to protect their owners. "[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals united for some lawful purpose... But the members do not, because of such association, lose their right to protection, and equality of protection."' 27 Consequently, the corporation's property was really the property of its investors and should be treated as such:"' "To deprive the corporation of its property... is in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property." 9 Under this view of the corporation, often termed the aggregation or associational theory, the corporate person is the aggregation of the natural persons within, and is essentially their alter ego.1 3 0 (2010). The real entity theory "views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers." Id at 1001.
125. The aggregation theory followed the concession theory of the corporation, which dominated in the first half of the nineteenth century. The concession or artificial entity theory viewed the corporation as no more than the creation of the state. During this period, legislatures had to approve by special act the charter of each and every corporation. 130. Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights, supra note 35, at 221 (explaining that under aggregate theory, "the corporate person has no existence or identity that is separate Nonetheless, the main characteristics of the modern corporation negate the notion that it is simply an aggregation of individuals. Three major features define the modern corporation: limited liability for shareholders, perpetual life for the corporation, and separation of owners and managers, especially in publicly traded corporations.13 By the end of the nineteenth century, all three had become standard.' 32 Limited liability is perhaps the most salient characteristic of the modern corporation. Unlike partnerships or sole proprietorships, the shareholders of corporations are liable only for the amount they have invested. ' 34 The investors' finances and the corporation's finances are separate, so that investors are not responsible for the corporation's debts.
13
1 Indeed, one of the main purposes of the corporate form is to create an entity that is distinct from its owners. Limiting liability in this way enhances corporations' ability to attract capital, 136 which in turn allows corporations to undertake expensive, large-scale projects. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court observed, "Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises., 13 7 Limited liability alone precludes equating the modern corporation with its shareholders. The modern corporation's other features, such as perpetual life, further undermine an aggregate view-corporations potentially last forever; the people that compose them do not 1 3 -but limited liability suffices on its and apart from the natural persons in the corporation."); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1001 (explaining that aggregate theory "views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders"). 131. Advantageous tax treatment might be considered another. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unlike natural persons, corporations have 'limited liability' for their owners and managers, 'perpetual life,' separation of ownership and control, 'and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets."').
132. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1012. 133. Most states had adopted limited liability by the 1840s. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1008-09.
134. In a partnership, for example, a general partner would be personally liable, i.e., liable to the whole extent of his property, for the debts of the partnership. UNIF. 138. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 112 (noting that corporations can last forever, "a perpetual existence, that its individual members did not share").
own. As one scholar has noted, "Limited liability . . . led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory because the aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction between the corporation and its members or shareholders, which is at the heart of limited liability."' 39 Aggregate theory assumes the shareholders and the corporation are one and the same, while limited liability insists that they are not."14 To equate the two, as the Hobby Lobby Court did, "eviscerate[s] the fundamental principle that a corporation is a legally distinct entity from its owners."' 4 ' Thus even closely-held corporations where the shareholders are also the managers cannot qualify as associations.
When the shareholders are not the managers, the associational argument, already implausible, becomes absurd. The shareholders cannot be considered the alter egos of their corporation when they play little role in running it, which is the case when ownership and management are separate.' 42 The rise of the business judgment rule, where a corporation's directors are not liable to shareholders for their business decisions so long as the decisions were informed, made in good faith, and meant to benefit the corporation, 43 further reduces the owners' influence as it limits their ability to challenge management's decisions. "The business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding that the board of directors possessed powers that were not delegated from the shareholders and that shareholders could not normally call into question the exercise of those powers."'" In sum, the modern corporation cannot be viewed as an association. 144. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1018.
b. Employees are not voluntary members
Once employees are factored into the analysis, it becomes more evident than ever that a corporation cannot be described as a voluntary association. Employees of for-profit corporations cannot be equated to the voluntary members of a church. As Justice Ginsburg aptly noted in dissent, "Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations."14 So far, I have not specified which natural persons potentially make up the corporate person. The previous section assumed that at a minimum it includes the corporation's owners, and argued that under even this narrow view an aggregate theory makes no sense. In reality, though, a corporation is not so limited and must also include both those who manage it and those who work for it.
1 4 6 A corporation could not function without its employees. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court only acknowledged in passing that employees are among those associated with a corporation, and never addressed the theoretical implications of that association.
Although employees are indispensable members of a corporation, 147 In contrast, most people work because they must. They need the paycheck.' 52 Without a job, employees could not feed their families, meet their rent, or pay for healthcare. Laws that protect employees, including workplace anti-discrimination laws and minimum wage laws, are so strong precisely because of the essential nature of employment.' 53 In short, employment is an economic necessity. People cannot choose whether or not to work.
One response might be that while employment itself may be compulsory, employment at these particular religious corporations may be voluntarily chosen precisely because of their principles. Despite the tendency to ignore employees altogether, as the Supreme Court more or less did, some of the more thoughtful corporate religious liberty supporters have 154. Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation As a Tocquevillian Association, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (2012) ("An employee vote... would go a long way toward establishing the authenticity and credibility of a corporation's claims of association."); Helfand, supra note 24, at 411 (arguing that court should consider employees' perspective when evaluating corporate claims). While he was addressing exemptions for churches rather than exemptions for for-profit corporations, Douglas Laycock also emphasized that voluntariness was a necessary predicate. See supra notes 115 and 119 and accompanying text. they tend to be too quick to assume its presence. 5 For example, in arguing that for-profit corporations can qualify as associations, one proponent explains that he does not mean all for-profit corporations, only those that amount to "a genuine community of individuals-investors, owners, officers, employees, and customers-coming together around a common shared vision or shared set of goals, values, or beliefs.' 5 6 Despite this caveat, he is satisfied that the cooks and cashiers who work for a national fastfood chain "appear to actively support" their CEO ' of the Christian Sabbath."). Indeed, while Colombo is willing to speculate "that customers and employees appear to actively support" the CEO's views, the accompanying footnote cites to (1) a news story about customer support not employee support and (2) employee reviews, almost none of which mention religion at all.
158. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 24, at 424 (arguing that accepting a job with a corporation that "holds itself out as strongly committed to religious principles" essentially means giving consent to abide by its religious decisions regarding the contraception mandate); cf. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1409 (in discussing church employees, arguing that "[w]hen an employee agrees to do the work of the church, he must be held to submit to church authority in much the same way as a member").
159 employees may be able to find a comparable full-time position without difficulty, the assumption that employees are always able to choose employers whose values match their own relies on a Lochner-era view of employment opportunities. 1 6 2 In short, if a Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. sales associate disagrees with her benefits package, there is probably not much she can do about it. 163 The claim that dissenting employees can simply find a more amenable job is not only unrealistic but also somewhat unprincipled. Again, the Hobby Lobby Court did not make this argument; it ignored the issue altogether. Corporate religious liberty plaintiffs, however, have, without ever explaining why the "find an alternate" argument does not apply to them. If they do not like the restrictions placed on running a corporation, then perhaps they should find another endeavor where their religious practices do not clash with employment laws. Indeed, the argument arguably has stronger force with regard to for-profit corporations: society grants them certain special advantages, including limited liability and other financial benefits. Those benefits are coupled with certain obligations." 6 Among them is to obey society's employment protection laws.
In sum, the claim that for-profit corporations deserve religious exemptions just like churches is deeply flawed. That corporate employees are not voluntary in the same way as church members are is one of many reasons why arts and crafts stores, wood cabinet makers, and HVAC equipment manufacturers differ from St. Augustine Church, Temple Beth-Am, or Masjid ul Mumilneen.' 6 5 These for-profit corporations simply do not share 162. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,323 (1998) (rejecting the assumption that "workers are voluntary participants in the firm and have the power to protect themselves" due to "inefficiencies and illiquidity in the labor market").
163. This lack of choice is not limited to low-income hourly earners. A former professor at Notre Dame University, after emphasizing that over 200 people had applied for her position, wrote, "If you thought people must surely know in advance that working at a Catholic university will restrict their health care choices, or that people who don't want to work within those restrictions can simply find another job, I am here to tell you that you are wrong on both counts. 165. Cf Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 24, at 374 (noting "our intuitive reluctance to equate the free exercise claims of Wal-Mart with those of First Presbyterian the qualities that have been cited to justify churches' preferential treatment. First, their overriding purpose is not religion. Second, they are not sacred. Third, they do not play a pivotal role in protecting and advancing religion. Fourth, it is impossible to describe for-profit corporations as voluntary religious associations.
PART II: THE HARM OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Religious exemptions for for-profit corporations are problematic not just because they are without theoretical foundation, but because they will harm the employees of exempted corporations. To start, for-profit corporations will seek exemptions from laws-such as the contraception mandate-that are meant to protect their employees. In addition, corporate religious liberty will come at the expense of employees' individual religious liberty.
Religious accommodations have always raised the concern that the religious observer will become above the law." 6 Besides the risk of legal chaos, ' 67 exemptions risk imposing substantial burdens on third parties. Not all religious exemptions impose on others," 6 but many do. When a Sabbath observer refuses weekend shifts, odds are a co-worker will be assigned them. 69 The greater the burden-shifting, the more problematic the exemption.
Exemptions from the contraception mandate rank as highly burdensome. The corporate actors litigating these actions are not small mom-and-pop establishments but large companies. After Church"). Vischer astutely observes that extending the same level of protection to businesses runs the risk of diminishing protection for all religious claimants. Id. at 387.
166. Emp't Div., Dep't Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." ).
167. Id. at 888 (holding that contemplating an exemption any time a law conflicts with someone's faith would be "courting anarchy, [and] that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs"). all, the mandate only applies to corporations with more than fifty full-time employees. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., for example, with its 500 plus stores, earns roughly 3 billion dollars every year and employs more than 13,000 full-time employees. 17 To make matters worse, granting religious exemptions to forprofit corporations will exacerbate the power imbalance between corporate employers and their employees. 7 " With their vast concentrations of wealth, there is no gainsaying the power of corporations. "Corporations are more powerful than any institution other than government, and in many cases, more powerful than governments."' ' As Justice Stevens observed in his Citizens United dissent, corporations "inescapably structure the life of every citizen."'' Their power is not the same as the states, but it is potentially just as coercive. 8 2 Thus, "individuals," including employees, "arguably can be victims of corporate oppression as easily as victims of state oppression.""' 3 Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause (and RFRA) as granting corporations the right to religious exemptions will substantially "enhance their repressive power.""' 8 This is especially true when the corporation This awareness may well be what prompted the Supreme Court to suggest that for-profit enterprises are not eligible for free exercise protection: When rejecting the free exercise claim of an Amish employer, Court wrote: "Granting an exemption.., to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees.. ' ' 191 In addition to allowing corporations to dictate their employees' health care options, granting religious exemptions to corporations will have wide-ranging repercussions. 192 It will set a precedent for corporations to escape legal requirements designed to protect employees against their more powerful and potentially exploitive employers. Privileging corporate religious conscience over employee religious conscience also risks making religious liberty yet another luxury reserved for those at the top.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis for corporate religious liberty. The theoretical justifications for free exercise exemptions do not lead to corporate religious liberty. Exemptions to individuals are granted in order to accommodate people's religious conscience. Unlike actual people, however, for-profit corporations have neither a relationship with the divine nor an inherent dignity that must be respected. Exemptions for churches, considered sacred and theologically significant, are granted for reasons not applicable to for-profit corporations. If nothing else, corporations are not like churches because they cannot be classified as voluntary associations. Most troublesome, corporate religious liberty sacrifices employees' employment and religious rights in order to benefit (powerful) corporate employers.
